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Abstract— Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has 
been identified as a secure method for providing 
symmetric keys between two parties based on the 
fundamental laws of quantum physics, making 
impossible for a third party to copy the quantum 
states exchanged without being detected by the sender 
(Alice) and receiver (BoB) and without altering the 
original states. However, when QKD is applied in a 
deployed optical network, physical layer intrusions 
may occur in the optical links by injecting harmful 
signals directly into the optical fibre. This can have a 
detrimental effect on the key distribution and 
eventually lead to its disruption. On the other hand, 
network architectures with software defined 
networking (SDN) benefit from a homogeneous and 
unified control plane that can seamlessly control a 
QKD enabled optical network end-to-end. There is no 
need for a separate QKD control, a separate control 
for each segment of an optical network and an 
orchestrator to coordinate between these parts. 
Furthermore, SDN allows customised and 
application tailored control and algorithm 
provisioning, such as QKD aware optical path 
computation, to be deployed in the network, 
independent of the underlying infrastructure. 
Therefore, in this manuscript, we investigate the 
integration of the application, SDN and QKD 
infrastructure layers and confirm capability for 
flexible supervision and uninterrupted key service 
provisioning in the event of link level attacks. An 
experimental demonstrator is used, for the first time, 
to verify the architecture proposed, considering real-
time monitoring of quantum parameters and fiber-
optic link intruders to emulate real-world conditions. 
Furthermore, attacks on a standard single-mode fiber 
(via a 3dB coupler) and a multicore fiber (via an 
adjacent core) are undertaken to explore different 
connectivity between QKD units. Results show an 
additional attacker identification and switching time 
of less than 60ms for the link cases investigated, 
being negligible compared to the total (re)-
initialization time of 14 minutes of the QKD units.  
 
Index Terms—software defined networking, 
quantum key distribution, multicore fiber, link 
failure mitigation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
urrent optical networks integrate different domains 
(e.g. core, metro, access) over an optical fiber platform 
to fulfill the requirements of large capacity, low power 
consumption and longer reach [1]. This characteristic of 
large data rate permitted by the fiber optic is also required 
in modern data centers where the growth of IP traffic 
occurs at a rate of 25% every year and will continue until a 
total of 20.6 zettabytes is reached by 2021 [2]. However, 
these complex and high-bandwidth networks based on 
optical fiber connections are susceptible to security 
breaches since the data from the optical fiber can be 
tapped without being detected. To this end, security in 
optical networks relies on different encryption methods, 
with Advanced Standard Encryption (AES) being one of the 
most used [3]. This method encrypts data with a secure 
key of 128 or 256 bits size, to convert the data in a 
cyphertext.  
A strong candidate for data encryption in installed 
optical networks is quantum key distribution (QKD) [4]. 
QKD is foreseen as an important technique for sharing 
cryptographic keys in present and future secure 
communication networks [5]. In optical networks, QKD 
relies on the generation and distribution of symmetric keys 
by transmitting single photons from a sender, Alice, to a 
receiver, Bob, over an optical channel. Any eavesdropping 
attempt by Eve can be detected because measuring a 
photon on which a key bit is encoded, will cause an 
irreversible change. Thus, QKD offers advanced security 
features as a result of the fundamental constraints 
prescribed by quantum mechanics. 
However, QKD sensitivity to the optical losses and the 
noise level of the links increase the technology 
susceptibility against physical-layer attacks and becomes 
the main security threat in optical QKD networks [6,7]. An 
attack over an individual optical fiber link can be executed 
by acting on the quantum channel, increasing the noise 
above the threshold of security and disrupting the key 
generation, despite the availability of the QKD link. Denial 
of service (DoS) attacks have been identified as a QKD 
vulnerability in [8] since QKD easies the disruption of 
secure transmissions due to abortion of key generation 
whenever tampering is detected. Nevertheless, with the 
availability of several optical paths within a network with 
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QKD resources, the mitigation of attacks is envisaged as 
described in [7].   
Various approaches integrating QKD in a network scale 
have been successfully demonstrated worldwide including 
field trials [9-12]. However, optical networks are 
continuously evolving to complex network architectures 
requiring advanced programmability. Software defined 
Networking (SDN) fulfills this programmability and 
network management needs since SDN decouples the 
control plane from the data plane, enabling an end-to-end 
flexible configuration of the data plane devices from a 
centralized control entity, called the SDN controller, as 
well as a more efficient orchestration and automation of 
the network services [13]. Based on this centralized 
controller, SDN has the capability to respond to continuous 
demand of network resources since the entire information 
of the network is contained in one network operating 
system [14]. These SDN feature allows for it to be used as 
a converged network control mechanism that can 
simultaneously and in a coordinated manner control 
different segments  of an end-to-end optical network (core, 
access, metro)  and its associated networking systems such 
QKD security. Furthermore, it allows deployment for 
customized network control algorithms independent of 
underlying  infrastructure such as load balancing, network 
slicing or QKD-aware path computation.     
These SDN functionalities are the key motivator for the 
integration of QKD in an SDN-enabled optical network, as 
shown in [15,16,17,18,19,20,21]. The current works have 
proved that the SDN integration is beneficial for the QKD 
networks for customized network configuration (e.g. path 
computation algorithm) for optimum QKD performance. In 
particular, in [22] it has been demonstrated that the 
combination of QKD and SDN can provide continuous real-
time monitoring of quantum parameters, such as quantum 
bit error rate (QBER) and secret key rate (SKR), and 
flexible configuration of optical paths to ensure the 
uninterrupted distribution of quantum keys in a network 
prone to physical-layer attacks or with randomly appearing 
physical impairments.  
  
However, most of the QKD network demonstrations to 
date utilize a dedicated dark fiber, with single photons 
being transmitted over a separate optical fiber path. 
Classical optical modulated signals exhibit more than eight 
orders of magnitude of additional power in comparison to 
the quantum signal. This high power present on the 
classical channels generates noise that proliferates across 
wavelengths, prohibiting the transmission of encoded 
photons and the generation of keys across the same optical 
fiber [23,24]. This impacts the network infrastructure since 
additional optical fibers are required for transmission of 
the classical data, adding complexity and cost to existing 
networks. On the other hand, significant progress on 
multicore fiber (MCFs) technologies has allowed the 
consideration of space-division multiplexing (SDM) 
concepts as a viable solution in multi-dimensional 
networking [25]. To this end we propose and study MCFs 
as the SDM enabling solution that allows not only the 
classical and quantum channels coexistence in a natural 
manner without deploying surplus fiber links [26], but also 
the enhancement of the attack mitigation techniques using 
SDN as a platform to select an alternative secure path.   
In this paper, the practical investigation of physical-
layer intrusions over quantum channels is presented in 
combination with SDN for mitigating the attack and 
provision of continuous secure connectivity of QKD units. 
In addition, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, attacks 
over quantum channels have not been investigated in SDM 
(MCF) and in this work, the experimental demonstration 
has been used to verify the impact and to probe the 
mitigation technique using SDN and real-time monitoring. 
This work details the concept of a SDN-based network 
control application suitable for mitigating a channel attack 
in a QKD network and extends the results of [22] with 
further investigations of the impact of the optical fiber 
length in SSMF, the effect of wavelength-tuning the 
attacker  and the result of crosstalk in MCFs and inter-
core MCF switching after adjacent-core attack. 
Characterization of the MCF is shown as well as 
fundamental descriptions of the encryption operation with 
respect to key material. This work is organized as follows: 
in section II of this paper, we review the physical layer 
security in traditional optical networks and MCF-based 
networks, in section III we present the QKD system 
architecture, in section IV, the optical network components 
for QKD are described followed by section V with the QKD 
scenarios supported by SDN. Section VI includes the 
implemented physical layer attackers and section VII 
describes the experimental results. Finally, section VIII 
concludes the manuscript.  
II. REVIEW OF PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY OVER OPTICAL 
FIBERS 
Service disruption and eavesdropping are the main 
effects of physical layer attacks. In [27,28] three types of 
attacks are highlighted: i) signal insertion attacks, ii) 
signal splitting attacks and, iii) physical infrastructure 
attacks. In the signal insertion attacks, destructive signals 
are added into the fiber network, causing service 
degradation. These attacks can potentially cause DoS, 
isolating nodes due to the low quality of transmissions.  
High-powered jamming attacks, with power levels of 5-
10dBs above the typical 
power can be inserted into optical channels used within the 
network (in-band jamming) or in channels beyond the 
network use (out-of-band jamming). Physical impairments 
such as nonlinearities and crosstalk can occur due to these 
attacks. Moreover, these nonlinearities can be a 
consequence of flexi-grid networks with combined line 
rates and modulation formats. From the installation and 
 
Fig. 1. Quantum key distribution supported by software defined 
networking with real-time monitoring 
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3 
implementation point of view, network sites are vulnerable 
to malicious operation where the power level of the lasers 
can be modified, and harmful signals can be inserted in 
patch panels. Besides, monitoring ports in amplifiers, 
wavelength selective switches (WSSs) and optical switches 
can be an attractive attacking insertion point since access 
to signals is undertaken by splitters.  
Signal splitting attacks arise whenever the attacker 
split or remove part of the signal carried in the network. 
This splitting provokes signal eavesdropping or 
degradation and suitable detection of this kind of attacks is 
difficult. On the optical fiber side, by manipulating the 
fiber cladding and bending the fiber, light can be radiated 
to a monitoring device for eavesdropping.   
The third type corresponds to physical infrastructure 
attacks which are all the attacks that damage or tamper 
the optical network infrastructure, i.e. cutting a fiber, 
unplugging connections or destroying optical components. 
With regards to SDM, physical layer attacks have 
recently been studied in [29,30]. Essentially, a 
transmitting signal over a single core of an MCF will suffer 
from the crosstalk induced by the attack in an adjacent 
core created by an incoming optical signal. The amount of 
inter-core crosstalk will depend on the position and 
direction of the attacked core with respect to the core 
selected for signal transmission [31]. In [29], results show 
that individual MCF connections are highly vulnerable to 
the high-power jamming attacks, especially the ones with 
more complex modulation formats or longer reaches. In 
addition, the effect of the jamming attacks is more 
noticeable at the network level with significant number of 
data connections being disrupted. In [30], attack-aware 
routing, spectrum and core assignment algorithms are 
proposed, prioritizing to avoid physical-layer security 
threats and to try to reduce the crosstalk-induced 
impairments.  
 
Fig. 2. Database schema for storing the alternative paths of the 
quantum channel 
III. QKD SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Fig. 1 shows the key components of the proposed 
architecture of a real-time monitored QKD system over a 
software-defined optical network. This approach follows 
the traditional SDN architecture with an infrastructure 
layer, a control layer and an application layer. The 
infrastructure layer comprises of QKD units, Layer 2 
encryptors/ decryptors and optical switches. The SDN 
controller lies in the control layer and manipulates the 
data layer through the southbound interface, (i.e. 
OpenFlow). All the software applications that leverage the 
advantages of the SDN controller and are responsible for 
the decision-making remain in the application layer and 
communicate with the SDN controller through the 
northbound interface, in our case the Representational 
State Transfer-Application programming interface (REST 
API). Information about all the different components of the 
proposed architecture, are summarized in Table I. 
TABLE I. 
System Specifications 
MCF Parameters Value 
Fibre Type 
Mode Field Diameter (MFD) 
Propagation Loss 
Inter-core crosstalk 
Core Pitch 
Step Index Core Multicore Fibre 
10.3µm @1550nm 
0.2dB/km @1550nm 
-48dB/1000m @1550nm 
44.7µm (average) 
QKD Device Parameters Value 
Model 
Laser Wavelength 
QKD Protocol 
Distance (Maximum) 
Secret Key Rate 
Clavis2, IDQuantique 
1552nm 
BB84 
50Km@10dB of loss 
> 500 bps over 25 km 
Encryptors Value 
Model 
Encryption algorithm 
Key refreshment period 
Centauris, IDQuantique 
AES 256 GCM 
1min 
Link 1 Characteristics Value 
Fibre Type 
Link Length 
Link Power Loss 
SSMF 
500m/2km 
4.2dB 
Link 2/3 Characteristics Value 
Fibre Type 
Link Length 
Link Power Loss 
7core - MCF 
1km 
4dB 
Link 4 Characteristics Value 
Fibre Type 
Link length 
Link Power Loss 
Number of hops 
SSMF 
515m 
6.14dB 
2 
SDN controller Value 
SDN controller version 
Southbound Interface 
Northbound Interface 
OpenDaylight Lithium 
OpenFlow 1.0 
REST API 
IV. QKD OPTICAL NETWORK COMPONENTS 
The components for the distribution of quantum-secured 
keys are illustrated in Fig. 1. Node 1 includes an Alice 
QKD unit (Clavis2, IDQuantique [32]), and a key server 
(running Linux). In an analogous way, Node 2 contains a 
Bob QKD unit and a key server. Typically, in an optical 
network infrastructure, two QKD nodes will be 
interconnected by different optical links where optical 
components as well as optical fibers will be selected to 
optimize the power budget and to avoid any possibility of 
noise interference due to optical amplifiers. In this 
network architecture, an optical fiber (or core of the MCF) 
is dedicated to the quantum channel that will be used for 
the transmission of the encoded photons. The classical 
channels (i.e. channels used for the QKD protocol and data 
transmission), are also assigned to optical fiber links 
where a pair of fibers is required for bidirectional 
transmission and reception. 
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Fig.3. Workflow of the QPA decision making for the link failure 
mitigation 
A. Data transmission encryption 
Fig. 1 depicts the data transmission channels, which are 
also interfacing an optical fiber network. Layer 2 
encryptors/decryptors (Centauris CN8000, IDQuantique 
[33]) are used in both nodes of Fig. 1 and are connected 
optically to the respective key servers. The traffic sent by 
the servers to the encryptors is ciphered with a 256-bit key 
received from the QKD units, using AES-256 GCM 
encryption. The encrypted data is then transferred to the 
end-node and decrypted using the same symmetric key. 
The key used in the encryption is refreshed every 1 minute, 
but this can be adapted according to the requirements of 
the system. The more frequent the key is refreshed, the 
more secure the encryption becomes. However, the 
frequent key refreshment could decrease the network 
throughput and lead to an exhaustion of the key material 
in the buffers [34]. In case of a quantum-channel attack, 
the encryptors will continue to use QKD keys that were 
previously generated and are saved in the key buffer of the 
key server. This buffer can be filled with a maximum of 
1Mbits of key material before the buffer needs to be 
refreshed with new key material.   
B. Quantum parameters monitoring and SDN 
implementation 
The key enabling technology used in this proposed 
network architecture is the software-defined optical 
network [13]. The control of the network is achieved 
through an SDN controller with a network-wide view. The 
SDN controller uses open APIs to configure the different 
network devices, thus enabling a dynamic QKD network 
configuration. To further enhance the capabilities of SDN, 
a Quantum Parameters Monitor (QPM) application is also 
introduced. The application enables the real-time 
monitoring of the important parameters for the QKD 
system’s performance, such as the SKR and the QBER. 
The QPM application analyzes the values of the received 
parameters and compares them with pre-defined threshold 
values. An optical link failure in the quantum channel or a 
disruption of the key-exchange service will result in higher 
QBER values and consequently lower SKR values or no key 
generation. Therefore, the QPM can decide to change the 
current QKD channel transmission path to a new secure 
operational path. This will be achieved with the assistance 
from the SDN controller, which will provide and configure 
an alternative optical path. 
Regarding the SDN implementation, an extended 
version of the OpenDaylight SDN controller is used with 
OpenFlow plugins that enable configuring the optical 
switches of the testbed. The SDN controller is also 
extended to communicate with the QPM application, which 
runs and monitors continuously the running QKD systems. 
The interface used for the communication between the 
SDN controller and the QPM is the REST API, as stated 
before. The SDN controller interfaces with a database 
(SQLite), which schema can be seen in Fig. 2. The database 
holds the information about all the alternative quantum 
channel paths between the different end-nodes of the QKD 
network. Specifically, the table fields are the names of the 
end-nodes of the path (sitename, connected_sitename), the 
distance between them (sitename) and all the connections 
between the optical switches in between them 
(optical_switch_left/ right_id and 
optical_switch_left/right_port), which need to be configured 
by the SDN controller.  
Fig. 3 shows the flow and decision making of the QPM 
application. After a link failure, the QPM decides to change 
the quantum channel path, collecting a list of all the 
alternative paths for the quantum channel from the SDN 
controller. The QPM application chooses the alternative 
path from the database abovementioned. The information 
of the selected path is sent from the QPM application to 
the SDN controller for configuration through a REST API 
POST request. The SDN controller undertakes the 
respective configuration of the optical devices and sends an 
acknowledgment response to the QPM. Following the 
switching to the new path, the QKD devices will re-
initialize and begin the key-exchange.   
V. SCENARIOS FOR QKD SUPPORTED BY SDN 
From Fig. 1 it is clearly observed that the optical 
network enables the interconnection of the QKD units. 
This connectivity is critical for the key generation and 
distribution. In addition, any physical layer attack or 
“jamming” in the optical fiber links will be detrimental to 
the process of key distribution, where any interference 
with the encoded photons will be considered as an intruder 
in the connection and the key generation will be disrupted, 
compromising the security of the data transmission.     
 
Fig. 4. Scenarios for the optical network 
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Fig. 4 shows the investigated link scenarios of an optical 
network with QKD resources. These scenarios are 
described as follows: 
 
A. Scenario 1  
The first scenario considers a link with a standard 
single-mode fiber (SSMF) interconnecting the QKD units 
via an optical fiber switch (Link 1, Fig. 4). This fiber switch 
represents the cross-connection in a reconfigurable optical 
add/drop multiplexer (ROADM) or an optical cross-connect 
(OXC) used in practical optical networks. Therefore, 
different paths can be used for network reconfigurability.   
   
B. Scenario 2 
The second scenario includes a 1km-long 7-core 
multicore fiber (MCF) with fan-in/fan-out interface. For 
this scenario, two links were considered, corresponding to 
two different cores of the MCF (Links 2 and 3 in Fig. 4).  
 
C. Scenario 3 
This last scenario includes additional optical fiber 
switches to represent a connection via multi-hop in the 
optical network (Link 4, Fig. 4). This kind of multi-hop 
configurations are typical of ring or mesh networks used in 
metropolitan or core networks. 
VI. PHYSICAL-LAYER ATTACKERS 
The scenarios of Fig. 4 show vulnerability to physical 
layer attacks and the “jamming” signal insertion attack is 
one of the most critical which may transform on a DoS of 
the users who rely on quantum encryption for the data 
communication. Two types of physical layer attacks are 
considered in here: i) an attack is directly aimed at the 
optical fiber link by inserting optical power via a 3-dB 
coupler (Fig. 5a) into the optical link and ii) an attack 
directly targets a MCF core corresponding to the quantum 
channel by injecting optical power in an adjacent core and 
inducing inter-core crosstalk (Fig. 5b). It is important to 
mention that the QKD system used [32] follows a two-way 
approach for passive autocompensation for fluctuations 
and that any attack over the QKD-Alice unit will be 
reflected back to the QKD-Bob unit, degrading the 
performance of the system and leading to keys not being 
generated. In addition, for the characterization of the 
attacked links, the inclusion of the optical switches was 
omitted, as shown in Fig. 5. Moreover, while DOS attacks 
can occur bi-directionally in QKD systems, in the present 
communication the attacks are undertaken in the direction 
to the QKD Alice unit. Detailed characterization of the 
attacks over the QKD Bob unit were undertaken in [22] 
and comparison of the simpler SMF case reveals negligible 
differences in the DOS behavior. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Physical layer attackers for a) link 1 and b) link 2 and 3. 
LNS; Laser Noise Source, WSS: Wavelength Selective Switch, BPF: 
Band Pass Filter, VOA: Variable Optical Attenuator, EBPF: High-
Edge Roll-Off BPF, MCF: Multicore Fiber, CPL: 3-dB Coupler, 
MON: Optical Power Monitor.  
 
In both types of attackers, a tunable distributed feedback 
(DFB) laser source is used and its spectrum is limited by a 
bandpass filtering and attenuation function in a 
wavelength-selective switch (Finisar WaveShaper® 
16000A). A band-pass filter with steeper roll-off edges was 
also used to further limit the Raman noise generated by 
the laser (Yenista XTM-50). This configuration allows an 
improved control of the amount of jamming optical power 
injected reflecting a less obvious attack, leading to a more 
active monitoring and programmability to mitigate the 
intrusion.  
 
Fig. 6. Cross-sectional figure of the 7-core MCF used for the 
experimental system setup. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. MCF CHARACTERISATION 
 
Fig. 6 shows the cross-sectional area of the MCF used. 
The MCF has an average core pitch of ~44.7 μm and a loss 
of 0.2 dB/km. Fig. 7 shows the measured static crosstalk 
between all the cores throughout the 1-km long MCF. Here 
a definition of the crosstalk is the ratio of the injected 
optical power on a selected core to the observed output 
power of another core. This resultant measured crosstalk 
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is the combination of the crosstalk observed in the MCF 
and the MCF fanouts. With this approximation, the 
location of a more suitable (i.e. less prone to crosstalk) core 
is possible for exchange of the QKD encoded photons.  
 
 
The observed inter-core crosstalk for the MCF of Fig. 
7 was statically characterized before the experiment 
was undertaken. However, as it is shown in [35], 
carrier-supporting signals may experience a strong 
dynamic time-dependence of inter-core crosstalk in a 
homogeneous multi-core fiber. Thus, the results 
plotted in Fig. 7 may have a fluctuation of >15 dB. 
B. Physical layer intrusion evaluation of a SSMF 
link 
To evaluate the impact of the physical layer attack over a 
SSMF link, Fig. 8 shows the SKR and QBER curves 
presented as a function of the optical power generated by 
the intruders into link 1 where the power is measured 
after the 3dB coupler (Fig.  5a). Two lengths of SSMF were 
selected: 500m and 2km. As it can be observed in Fig. 8, 
the SKR and QBER are kept within the limits of 1000b/s to 
1250b/s and 2.2% to 3.2%, respectively, up to a measured 
power of -51dBm, for both cases of SSMF lengths.  
 
 
 
When the optical power added to link 1 through the 3dB 
coupler is higher than -51dBm, the SKR decreases and the 
QBER increases until the generation of keys is not 
possible, since the number of errors is beyond the 
correcting limit. For the case of the SSMF with 2km of 
length, the power reflected due to backscattering is 
~1.5dBs higher than the case of the 500m of SSMF. This 
effect is reflected in the 1dB reduction of tolerance to 
injected power before the key generation is stopped (Fig. 
8).  
C. Physical layer intrusion evaluation of a MCF link   
Fig. 9 illustrates the impact of inter-core crosstalk over a 
quantum channel. In here the core used for the 
transmission of the encoded photon is core 6 and the 
intrusion was added to core 7, denoting a crosstalk of 
~45dB (Fig. 7). As observed, for an intruder input power 
higher than -28dBm, the inter-core crosstalk deteriorated 
the SKR and QBER up to a point where the generation of 
keys were impossible due to the high amount of errors 
induced by the optical power of the attacker in the adjacent 
core.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Measured SKR and QBER vs optical power for the case of 
optical intrusion over an adjacent MCF core to the QKD channel 
core (link 2 Fig. 4 and Fig. 5b). Dashed lines are polynomial fittings 
for the QBER and SKR curves   
 
To further understand the effect of crosstalk in the MCF, a 
common experimental setup shown in Fig. 10 was 
assembled. For the single core fiber study, the Quantum 
channel and the attacking CW wavelength are coupled 
through the 3dB coupler on the same core of the MCF, 
while for the case of MCF fiber study we launch the 
Quantum channel through the coupler (that is not 
bypassed) and the attacking CW is directly coupled on 
another core of the MCF. The injected optical power of the 
attacker for the case of single core is now measured in 
point B of the new experimental setup of Fig. 10 while the 
injected optical power for the case of MCF is taken in point 
A of Fig. 10. The total power loss in between the QKD Alice 
and Bob is 8dB for this testbed of Fig. 10. The measured 
SKR and QBER for the case of the SSMF and MCF are 
shown in Figs. 11 and 12, respectively. As observed in Figs. 
11 and 12, the injection of power using an adjacent core 
allows more input power (up to -27dBm) compared to the 
case of the intruder with the 3dB coupler, where the 
injected power is -59dBm before the key generation is 
stopped. This difference of ~32dB is due to the inter-core 
crosstalk in the MCF in the selected cores. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Measured SKR and QBER vs injected optical power for the 
case of the physical layer attacker over link 1 (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5a). 
Measured power w/OSA Anritsu MS9710B, @0.07nm  
resolution, 70dB dynamic range). Dashed lines are polynomial 
fittings for the QBER and SKR curves 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Measured MCF Crosstalk @1552nm. (Measurement taken 
with OSA with dynamic range of >58 dB @0.4nm from peak 
wavelength and lowest optical sensitivity of -70 dBm) 
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Fig. 10. Experimental setup for MCF crosstalk analysis with respect 
to scenario with 3dB coupler. Total new power loss in between Alice-
Bob is 8dB. 
 
 
Fig. 11. SKR and QBER measured when intruder power is injected 
using a 3dB coupler (Fig. 10 testbed). Dashed lines are polynomial 
fittings for the QBER and SKR curves 
 
 
Fig. 12. SKR and QBER measured when intruder power is injected 
in adjacent core 7 (Fig. 10 testbed). Dashed lines are polynomial 
fittings for the QBER and SKR curves 
 
 
Fig. 13. Description of experimental testbed used to characterize the 
effect of the filter from the Physical-layer attacker. BPF1: Band-
pass filter attacker (100GHz), BPF2: Band-pass filter QKD Alice 
unit (200GHz ITU). EBPF: High-Edge Roll-off BPF (150GHz). FM: 
Faraday Mirror  
 
D. Wavelength tuning effect of the DOS attacker 
In this section, the effect of tuning the wavelength of the 
laser source of the physical-layer attacker is investigated. 
Fig. 13 shows the testbed used and the location of the 
filters in the testbed. In this testbed, the total power loss 
between QKD Alice and Bob is 3dB. Fig. 14 illustrates the 
effect of tuning the wavelength of the attacker, considering 
an intrusive optical power QKD-Alice of -29.8dBm. For a 
center wavelength below 1551.8nm, the QKD system 
delivered a SKR and QBER of 2200b/s and 1.4%, 
respectively. When the wavelength is increased, secret 
keys are not generated in between the wavelengths of 
1551.96nm and 1552.2nm (QBER were within the limits of 
4.9% and 4.3%). For a wavelength higher than 1552.2nm, 
the QKD system generated keys and the performance of 
the system presented similar SKRs and QBERs compared 
to the ones obtained below the 1551.8nm wavelength. As 
observed in Fig. 14, the flat-top response of the QBER is a 
direct response of the combined EBPF and BPF2 filters of 
Fig. 13.  
 
Fig. 14. Attacker wavelength tuning of the injected input power 
into the SSMF via a 3dB coupler. Dashed lines are polynomial 
fittings for the QBER and SKR curves 
 
E. Performance evaluation of the QPM application and the 
SDN in mitigating the link failure 
In this section, the latency measurements induced by the 
SDN architecture is presented to evaluate the effect of the 
QPM and SDN in the overall performance of the system. 
Specifically, the measured time for the process of link 
failure identification and re-allocation of the quantum 
channel path includes: i) the time required for the QPM 
application to identify the quantum link failure after the 
attack ii) the time for a REST API call to be sent from the 
QPM to the SDN controller, iii) the time needed for the 
SDN controller to send OpenFlow messages to the agent 
for optical switch configuration and, iv) the time 
undertaken by the optical switch to execute the suitable 
cross-connections required for link recovery (switching 
time of the optical switch ~10ms [36]).  
 
Fig. 15 shows the measured times for different 
processes of the experiment. The times were measured for 
all the link failure cases (i.e. no key generation after the 
attack). Case 1 considers the failure happening in Link 1 
and the SDN controller switches to Link 2. In Case 2 the 
failure happens in Link 2 and the controller switches to an 
adjacent low-inter-crosstalk core (core 1- Fig. 7) of the 
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MCF (Link 3). Lastly, Case 3 considers Link 2 being 
attacked and the path of Link 4 being selected for 
switching.    
     
In Fig. 15 it is observed that the time required by the 
SDN controller to identify the link failure and setup the 
new optical path is negligible compared to the other 
processing times, i.e. the time required for the QKD units 
to re-initialize and generate a new key from the new path.  
       
    Fig. 15. Measured times for different processes of the QPM/ SDN 
architecture in case of a link failure. 
 
The total time for the re-initialization after the change 
of optical path and until a new key is generated is longer 
than the first initialization times by additional ~4-6 
minutes for the selected link processes, except for the Case 
2. This derives from the fact that in Cases 1 and 3, the 
switching happens between two different links (i.e. two 
different SSMFs) with different losses and different optical 
fiber lengths (Table 1). This affects the initialization time 
for the QKD units since more time is required to 
synchronize and eventually generate keys from the new 
link. In the Case 2, Link 2 switches to Link 3, with the 
same length (~1km) and losses (~5.2dB) in both links (i.e. 
switching in between MCF cores), resulting in very close 
initialization times. 
 
Though in our implementation the identification/re-
allocation time from the SDN controller is 4 orders of 
magnitude lower than the re-initialization time required by 
the QKD equipment, the two timings can become 
comparable if the SKR is improved, as SKR also defines 
the execution times of the BB84 protocol. Four orders of 
magnitude improvement of the SKR compared to our 
current implementation of 1kb/s have already been 
demonstrated in [37], while additional improvements can 
be achieved by optimizing the re-initialization software 
stack.  
 
Fig. 16 illustrates the time subdivision of the measured 
~50ms for link failure identification/re-allocation of 
quantum channel path. As observed, 64% of the time is 
consumed during the REST API call sent from the QPM to 
the SDN controller. The remaining times are considered 
during SDN messaging to the optical switch, according to 
[38]. 
 
 
Fig. 16. Breakdown of times for identification-reallocation 
process in SDN controller. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. Output of the QPM application in the moment a link failure 
is detected. 
 
Fig. 17 shows the output of the QPM application software 
after a link failure is detected, triggered by the absence of 
key generation. Fig.17 depicts transaction IDs created 
corresponding to OpenFlow messages sent from the SDN 
controller to the optical switch, as shown in the Wireshark 
screenshot of Fig.18 for one transaction (ID 340762). Each 
transaction ID corresponds to a cross-connection in the 
optical switch resulting in a new quantum-secured path.  
 
 
Fig. 18. Wireshark captured OpenFlow messages from one of the 
optical switches. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We experimentally demonstrate the mitigation of 
multiple link failure scenarios as a particular feature of an 
SDN-enabled QKD network. A monitoring SDN application 
was developed to monitor in real-time the quantum 
parameters of SKR and QBER and react in the event of 
lack of key generation or irregular QBER values, selecting 
an alternative route for the quantum channel. Four 
different quantum channel links (including SSMF and 
MCF) were applied in this experiment to investigate the 
different effects on the performance of the proposed 
integrated system. A study on the different types of 
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attackers and a characterization of the MCF links is 
presented, showing the level of sensitivity of the QKD 
system under different types of link failures. This 
investigation shows how a SDN framework with quantum-
aware network control application, utilizing real-time 
monitoring of quantum parameters, can be successfully 
deployed in a QKD-enabled optical network. We 
demonstrated, using this framework, a secure data 
encryption scenario ensuring a continuous key generation 
service with insignificant delay regarding the link failure 
identification and re-allocation of secure quantum paths. 
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